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THE CONFRONTATION IN THE ELECTORAL
FORUM BETWEEN COMPELLED DISCLOSURE
AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING VITAL
RIGHTS
I. Introduction
"There are many prices we pay for the freedoms secured by the
First Amendment; the risk of undue influence is one of them, confirming what we have long known: freedom is hazardous, but some
restraints are worse." 1 So ended Chief Justice Burger's separate
opinion in Buckley v. Valeo,2 which highlighted the tension between
issues fundamental in our Constitution and to our society.
In the post-Watergate period, there has been an increase in public
interest and legislative activity concerning the regulation of the
political forum. However, this forum is particularly sensitive to governmental regulations; present within this milieu are some of the
citizen's most basic rights. Also, it is from this forum that the fabric
of government and society eventually emerge. Thus, regulatory activity in this area ought to be carefully examined to insure that
rights are not infringed upon and that any restrictions are carefully
examined so only the most necessary, if any, encroachments on a
citizen's rights are permitted. This Comment will discuss the right
of an individual to maintain the privacy of his beliefs and associations as it conflicts with the right of the government to compel
disclosure of a citizen's political activities.
A.

The Congressional Regulatory Authority and Enactments

The power of Congress to enact political disclosure legislation in
the field of elections was upheld in Burroughsand Cannon v. United
States.' In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements for political committees in the
1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 256 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting in part).
2. Id. The Buckley case presented a landmark decision in the field of federal election law.
As this Comment will discuss many issues which have been addressed in Buckley, it will
often return to that case. The present state of the law may only be properly discussed with
an understanding of the pre-Buckley statutory schemes, the impact of Buckley, and the resulting gaps and inconsistent applications of the law in the post-Buckley era.
3. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.1 However, the Burroughs
Court did not consider the impact that such disclosure requirements
might have on first amendment freedom of association and privacy
rights.5
In United States v. Harriss, the Supreme Court upheld the power
of Congress to enact political disclosure legislation in the related
area of the legislative process through the Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act.' Again, although the power of Congress was sustained
over the arguments that the statute was vague and in violation of
first amendment freedom of speech, publication, and petition protection, the Court did not consider associational and privacy guaranties.
Both these acts were forerunners of the most comprehensive of
electoral regulatory schemes, the Federal Election Campaign Act of
19718 (FECA 1971), as amended in 19741 (FECA 1974), and 197610
(FECA 1976).10.1 This Comment shall focus only on those provisions
4. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. I1, 43 Stat. 1070. (Although the Act
is codified mostly in various sections of 18 U.S.C., the disclosure requirements can be found
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-36 (1976)).
5. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
6. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
7. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1976). The relevant
disclosure provisions can be found at 2 U.S.C. §§ 264, 267.
8. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat. 3 (codified in
various sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C. (1976)).
9. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-433, 88 Stat.
1291.
10. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat.
475.
10.1. FECA 1971 and FECA 1974 (1) placed limits on contributions to candidates for
federal office, FECA 1974 § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (Supp. V 1975)); (2) limited
the allowable expenditures by individuals or groups relative to a candidacy, id. § 101(a)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. V 1975)); (3) limited the allowable expenditures by a
candidate for federal office from his personal or family funds, id. § 101(b)(1) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975)); (4) restricted primary and general election expenditures
by candidates, id. § 101(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975)); (5) created
the Federal Election Commission (the Commission) and bestowed extensive rulemaking,
adjudicatory, and enforcement powers upon this administrative agency, as well as investigative, record-keeping and disclosure functions, id. § 208(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)
(Supp. V 1975)); (6) provided for public financing of Presidential nominating conventions and
general election and primary campaigns through a related amendment to Subtitle H of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, The Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 562,
as amended FECA 1974, as amended Pub. L. No. 93-53, 87 Stat. 138 (codified at Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, chs. 95, 96); and lastly (7) instituted extensive reporting and disclosure requirements as to political contributions, FECA 1971 §§ 301-11 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp.
V 1975)).
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which instituted extensive reporting and disclosure requirements as
to political contributions.
The reporting and disclosure regulations of these recent acts basically required political committees to record the name and address
of each individual whose contribution exceeded $10, and additionally record the occupation and principal place of business of each
individual whose contribution exceeded $100." Also, political committees were required to file periodic reports with the Commission
disclosing the source of every contribution which exceeded $100, 1 as
well as the recipient and purpose of every expenditure over $100.'1
Lastly, all individuals or groups other than the candidate or political committee, which expected to receive contributions or make
expenditures totaling more than $100 in any calendar year, were
required to file a statement with the Commission." Any committee
which had not been designated by the candidate it supported as the
principal campaign committee were required to file reports including the aforementioned information with the principal campaign
committee. The designated principle campaign committee became
solely responsible for filing periodic reports with the Commission."
A.

II. Summary and Analysis of Buckley v. Valeo
The Impact on FECA 1971 and FECA 1974

The first major test of this electoral regulatory scheme in the
United States Supreme Court was presented in Buckley v. Valeo.11
11. FECA 1974 § 204 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 432 (Supp. V 1975)).
12. Id. § 202(a), 204(b)(3) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(b)(5), (6), (7), (Supp. V 1975)).
13. Id. § 204(b) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(9), (10) (Supp. V 1975)).
14. Id. § 204(b)(5) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (Supp. V 1975)).
15. Id. § 204(b) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 432(f)(2), (3) (Supp. 1975)).
16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The suit was filed originally in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. The original plaintiffs included United States Senator James L.
Buckley, former U.S. Senator Eugene McCarthy, the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency - McCarthy '76, the Libertarian Party, the Conservative Party of the State of New
York, the Mississippi Republican Party, the New York Civil Liberties Union, Inc., the
American Conservative Union, the Conservative Victory Fund, Human Events, Inc., and a
potential political contributor. The original defendants included the Secretary of the United
States Senate, the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, the Attorney General
of the United States, the Comptroller General of the United States, and the Federal Election
Commission. Id. at 7.
The complaint sought both an injunction against enforcement of the FECA of 1971 as
amended by FECA 1974 and a declaratory judgment that the major provisions of those acts
were unconstitutional. The plaintiffs sought a convocation of a three-judge district court and
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The Buckley Court struck down the limitations on campaign expenditures, the limitations on expenditures from a candidate's personal funds, and the limitations on independent expenditures by
individuals or groups as violative of first amendment rights. The
composition of the Federal Election Commission was also rejected
by the Buckley Court which found that the functions could only be
filled by "Officers of the United States" appointed in conformity
with article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution. 7 This forced
Congress to reconstruct the Commission to meet the constitutional
requirements."
The Supreme Court, however, also upheld many of the challenged
provisions. The Court rejected attacks on the constitutionality of
the limitations on contributions, the provision of public financing
of Presidential elections, and the disclosure and reporting requirements of the acts.
B.

The Plaintiffs' Case

The principles underlying the broad disclosure and reporting requirements were not attacked in this case. The plaintiffs instead
argued that in principle, narrowly-drafted disclosure and reporting
requirements would in themselves be sufficient to realize the electoral reform sought by Congress. However, the plaintiffs did unsuccessfully attack the form of the enacted reporting and disclosure
regulations on two grounds.
requested certification of the constitutional questions to the court of appeals. The district
judge denied the application for the three-judge district court and transmitted the case
directlyto the court of appeals. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court
with leave for other individuals and groups to intervene and with instructions to make findings of fact, to identify the constitutional issues, and to certify the constitutional questions
to the court of appeals. Id. at 9. This, the district court did, and thus remanded the case back
to the court of appeals with an extensive memorandum. The court of appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the acts with only one exception (a fatally vague requirement that all
individuals or groups seeking to influence the outcome of an election file reports with the
Commission). Id. at 10. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which found that at least some of the plaintiff-appellants had a sufficient personal stake in
the outcome of the matter to present a real and substantial controversy. Id. at 12. The
decision of the court of appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part in a per curiam
opinion. Id. at 144. The case produced six opinions from the eight justices hearing and
deciding the case, with Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Marshall, Rehnquist, and
Blackmun each filing opinions which concurred in part and dissented in part with the per
curiam opinion. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision of the case. Id. at 6.
17. Id. at 143.
18. FECA 1976 § 101(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c (1976)).
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First, the plaintiffs argued that the threshold amounts for disclosure were unnecessarily low. Second, they questioned the applicability of the requirements to minor party and independent candidacies. In these particular situations first amendment freedom of association rights are at stake, the plaintiffs argued, with no state interest of compelling importance to justify the overriding of basic rights.
The Court allowed the requirements to stand.'9
C.

The Court's Rationale

First, the Court stated the principle that the people, not the government, must as individuals and associations maintain control of
the political sphere.2" Many of the regulations, the Court found,
were in conflict with first amendment guaranties of freedom of expression and of association,21 and as they interfered with fundamental rights, such legislation was subject to the closest scrutiny. 2 Most
of the Buckley Court's rationale for the invalidation of many of the
regulations set forth by Congress was based on the principle of the
first amendment freedom of speech. The reporting and disclosure
requirements, however, were found to be more closely related to
fundamental rights concerning freedom of association.23
The freedom to associate, the Court posited, is not absolute and
sufficient governmental interests may allow infringement of this
basic right. Thus, although compelled disclosure may seriously infringe upon first amendment freedom of association and related
privacy guaranties, such disclosure requirements are to be upheld
when the government puts forward sufficient interests. 4
The Court found that three governmental interests were of sufficient magnitude to justify the infringement of first amendment
rights. The first was a public informational interest. Disclosure, the
Court stated, would serve this goal by allowing the public to more
precisely place a candidate in the political spectrum. Also, disclo19. 424 U.S. at 143.
20. Id. at 14.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 64-66.
23. Id. at 64.
24. Id. at 68. The Court here took notice of the wide-spread use of campaign disclosure
regulations as a tool of electoral reform. The District of Columbia and some thirty-one states
maintain pre-election periodic disclosure statutes, and many other states have post-election
disclosure laws.
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sure would facilitate public awareness of assistance being given a
candidate by special interest groups which may seek certain favors
in return.25 Another major governmental interest enhanced by disclosure was that of preventing actual or perceived corruption in the
electoral system by "exposing large contributions and expenditures
to the light of publicity."2 Third, prosecutorial interests in acquiring data through the recording and disclosure requirements posed
another major governmental interest in maintaining such laws. 7
Thus, the Court found that the governmental interest outweighed
the possible infringement of first amendment rights.28
III.

Freedom of Association and the Freedom from Disclosure:
The Decisional Development

The tension between freedom of association and disclosure requirements was not a new conflict to the Court. Indeed, the unfoldment of freedom of association occurred in a line of cases where
compelled disclosure was sought by the governmental bodies and
denied by the Court. In NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson," a
unanimous Court upheld the right of the NAACP to refuse to disclose the names and addresses of the organization's Alabama members and agents to the state attorney general's office. In a forceful
opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan clearly found that group association
involved issues of great constitutional importance: "It is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
'
30
embraces freedom of speech.
Justice Harlan went on to say that this basic right might be
irreparably impaired when certain groups are forced to make disclosure where there is a potential for harrassment:
25. Id. at 67.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 68.
28. Id.
29. 357 U.S. 449 (1957). The Court in this case reversed a judgment for contempt issued
by a state court. Contempt had been found at the state level due to the organization's refusal
to disclose the identities and addresses of the Alabama members and agents in defiance of a
state court order.
30. Id. at 460.
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This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations. . . . Inviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of
freedom of association. . . compelled disclosure of the petitioner's Alabama
membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioners and its
members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw
from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of
exposure."

Although many of the initial decisions which rejected disclosure
requirements as constitutionally infirm were related to activity by
the NAACP in the South," holdings by the Court have expanded
this protection to include other areas and circumstances.
A.

Protection in the Political Forum

In a long line of cases, the Court developed a right to privacy in
the political forum concerning the secrecy of the ballot." The Court
later expanded this protection to include the privacy of a citizen's
34 the Court
political loyalties. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
rejected the statutory political disclosure requirements in New Hampshire concerning a member of the Progressive Party. In a concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that privacy of an individual's political loyalties was a right of the most fundamental nature:
[tihe inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizen's political loyalties has
so overwhelming an importance to the well-being of our kind of society that
it cannot be constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so meagre a
countervailing interest. .

.

. In the political realm, as in the academic,

31. Id. at 462-63.
32. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). Justice Stewart, writing for a
unanimous Court, sustained the refusal of two local chapters of the NAACP to file a statement with the city clerk, in compliance with a local tax ordinance, listing contributors and
members as "compulsory disclosure ... would work a significant interference with the freedom of association ....
Id. at 523. Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293
(1961) (sustaining the refusal of the NAACP to comply with the membership disclosure
requirements imposed on certain types of organizations doing business in Louisiana); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
33. People v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 283, 311 (1868); Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89, 95 (1871).
For the later cases reaffirming this same right, see 90 A.L.R. 1362 (1934). Also, for a full
discussion on the issues and developments in this area, see Nutting, Freedom of Silence:
ConstitutionalProtection Against Governmental Intrusion in Political Affairs, 47 Mich. L.
Rev. 181 (1948) [hereinafter Nutting].
34. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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thought and
action are presumptively immune from inquisition by political
35
authority .

This protection of a citizen's privacy in his political activities is not
limited to active members of an organization. The Court extended
this protection to supporters in Bates8 and in United States v.
Rumely.37 In fact, NAACP v. Alabama,3 8 discussed above, originally
enunciated the principle that freedom of association protected the
members' and supporters' rights to express themselves through an
39
association, not the rights of the organization itself.
Political beliefs were among those citizen's beliefs protected by
the Court in Shelton v. Tucker.'" In Shelton, the Court struck down
certain disclosure requirements in the academic forum. The Court
stated that a law requiring teachers to disclose all of the organizations to which they contributed or of which they were members
during a five year period was violative of the teachers' rights to free
speech, privacy, and freedom of association." And again, in Talley
v. California,' the Court struck down a disclosure requirement as
violative of first amendment rights to privacy in association as well
as freedom of expression. In Talley, a Los Angeles city ordinance
which prohibited distribution of handbills which did not have
printed on them the names and addresses of the persons who prepared, distributed, or sponsored the handbills was rejected by the
Court which again found that such requirements violate fundamental constitutional rights.43
In all of these cases, the government's interest was weighed
against the infringement of first amendment rights and the state
interest was rejected. Compelled disclosure, the Court found, violated freedom of expression and association by creating in the members or contributors fear of reprisals for their involvements. The
35. Id. at 265-66.
36. 361 U.S. 516 (1961).
37. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
38. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
39. Id. at 459. See Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 Yale
L.J. 1, 4-5 (1964). See also Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of PoliticalOpportunity: The Constitutionalityof the FederalElection Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C. L. Rev. 389,
419 (1973) [hereinafter Fleishman].
40. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
41. Id. at 487.
42. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
43. Id. at 65.
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Court has not only considered an individual's rights to be free from
reprisals due to his association with an organization or expression
of beliefs, but also the right to be free from the deterrent influence
which may prevent an individual from participating in an organization or expressing a belief.44 All of these cases present a conflict
between important values and goals. Interests supporting the disclosure requirements of the government include the public's right to
know, and also the deterrence, as well as the substantiation, of
political corruption. In conflict with these interests is the freedom
of individuals to exercise their first amendment freedoms of speech,
association, and privacy.
Certain members of the Court have long felt that countervailing
governmental interests in disclosure fail when weighed against the
infringement of first amendment rights. These justices set forth
their position in a concurring opinion in Bates: "First Amendment
rights are beyond infringement either by legislation that directly
restrain their exercise or by suppression or by impairment through
harrassment, humiliation, or exposure by the government."' 5 However, the advocates of this position have never constituted a majority of the Court, which has consistently ruled that at a certain point,
governmental interests in disclosure may be so important as to outweigh the infringement of first amendment rights. The Court has
held that the right to privacy, without more, may be outweighed by
other interests." In this conflict, the absence of a threat of reprisal
and the related deterrent effect may tip the balance in favor of the
interests of the government in compelling disclosure."
IV. The Balancing of Conflicting Interests
A. The Requisite Governmental Interest in Compelling
Disclosure
A central question is how powerful the governmental interest in
the regulation must be before it can justify the related infringement
44. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative Committee, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See note 32 supra.
45. 361 U.S. 516, 528 (1960) (Black & Douglas, J.J., concurring).
46. Times, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
47. 424 U.S. at 143. Many commentators are in accord with this view. See Rosenthal,
Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 Harv. J. Legis. 359, 405 (1972); Lobel, Federal
Control of Campaign Contributions, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 42-43 (1966); Nutting, supra note
33.
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of rights guaranteed by the first amendment. A major problem in
answering this question stems from the Court's description of the
requisite showing in different and imprecise terms.48 In various opinions the Court has required that the governmental interest be
"important,"49 "compelling," 50 "substantial," 51 "subordinating,"52
''paramount,'' 53 "cogent,''" "strong,'' and most recently, "not
wholly without rationality."5.
The Court in United States v. O'Brien,57 however, did attempt
to create a framework for examining the governmental interest in
the regulation. The O'Brien Court stated that the regulation
would be "sufficiently justified if it is within the Constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
'5 8
to the furtherance of that interest.

1. The Test Applied
The government's primary interest in political disclosure regulations is that of fostering public knowledge and awareness. Its intention is that the voters and the press be given the information concerning who gave what to whom in the political forum. The propo48. The Court has admitted that it has failed to deliver a consistent precise rule of law
which may be applied in this area. However, it has set forth a set of factors to facilitate
determinations, as is discussed in the text. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77
(1967).
49. Id. at 377.
50. 471 U.S. at 438.
51. 357 U.S. at 464.
52. 361 U.S. at 524.
53. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
54. 361 U.S. at 524.
55. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963).
56. 424 U.S. at 83.
57. 391 U.S. 367 (1967). The court of appeals below in Buckley considered United States
v. O'Brien as dispositive of many of the issues presented in Buckley. Specifically, the Court
found that O'Brien would allow the regulations to stand without violating first amendment
rights as the regulations dealt with conduct, not speech. 519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The Supreme Court in Buckley rejected this approach as applied to the expenditure issue.
The per curiam opinion stated that "[this Court has never suggested that the dependence
of communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a non-speech
element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." 424 U.S. at
16.
58. Id. at 377.
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nents of the position favoring the public's right to know state that
such disclosure enhances the ability of the electorate to choose between candidates in a political contest, fosters confidence in public
officials, and has a deterrent effect on potential poltical corruption."9 This last result is itself an interest held by the government
to be a significant product of political disclosure regulations. That
disclosure of financial entanglements will deter those in the public's
eye from offering even an appearance of political corruption or favoritism is the second major interest served by such regulation.
Lastly, the-disclosure regulations make possible less cumbersome
detections of violations of campaign regulations. ° Thus, the government may put forward several weighty interests in favor of disclosure regulations which, the Court has held, in certain circumstances
serve to outweigh the damage done in tramelling on the individual's
first amendment rights and guaranties.
B. The Interests Supporting Freedom from Disclosure
The Supreme Court has made it clear that when balancing

governmental interests against citizen's rights, the scale will not always
fall in favor of the government. The freedom of association guarantee was first enunciated in a line of cases where the Court rejected
the government's interest in disclosure. 1 Although some commentators have attempted to distinguish this line of cases offering protection from disclosure from those enforcing the regulations as a difference between the right to privacy and freedom of association for
socio-economic change versus the right to privacy and freedom of
association for political activity, 2 such distinctions seem tenuous.
The Buckley Court stated that in cases where the state interest
sought to be advanced is not substantial and if the threat to the
exercise of first amendment rights is exacerbated, the disclosure
regulations could not be constitutionally imposed. 3 None of the
plaintiffs in Buckley were able to persuade the Court that such was
their plight. Although the Court attempted to elaborate on the requisite showing which must be made before an organization could
59. Id. at 66.
60. Id. at 68.
61. See notes 29-32,supra.
62. See Fleishman, supra note 39, at 411.
63. 424 U.S. at.71.
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meet this judicially created exemption from the disclosure requirements, the efforts apparently failed. The Buckley Court established
the requirements that the necessary showing ought not be overly
strict; 4 that the organization must be allowed sufficient flexibility; 5
and that evidence need only show a reasonable probability that
disclosure will result in official or unofficial reprisals. 6 However, the
Court went on to state that evidence in such cases would include
specific evidence of past or present harassment directed at the
organization or at the members thereof due to their associational
ties with the organization. 7
C. The Inconsistent Application by the Federal Courts of the
Requisite Evidentiary Showing
There has been considerable confusion in the courts applying ,the
law in this area. The center of the judicial inconsistency seems to
be in the application of this balancing test and the requisite showing
that must be made to qualify for the exemption. Several courts have
interpreted the tests differently and have demanded, with varying
degrees of severity, proof of damage to first amendment rights.
1. A Pre-Buckley Standard
Prior to the Buckley decision, the Conservative Party of the State
of New York in Pichler v. Jennings" questioned the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements of FECA 1971. The Conservative Party asserted that the regulations unconstitutionally infringed
upon its members' freedom of association and of privacy. However,
the Pichler court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the
Conservative Party failed to allege specific instances of harrassment
or reprisals suffered by members of the organization, and that the
court thus lacked clear factual controversy upon which the balancing may be determined.69 Thus, the court set out a strict standard
which the organization had to meet even to state a cause of action.
The court presented the Conservative Party with a dilemma,
whether to seek exemption from disclosure regulations to protect the
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 74.
Id.
Id.
Id.
347 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 1069.
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rights of its present and potential members and contributors by
declaring that undesirable effects might accompany being associated with the political Organization, or to allow the infringement
of its members' constitutional rights. The very proof required by
this court to state a cause of action would have a severe chilling
effect upon the present involvement of its members. Also, potential
members and contributors would not seem likely to rush to the
organizational ranks of those being abused.
Lastly, the court stated that to successfully challenge the constitutionality of the provisions, the Conservative Party would have to
demonstrate that as a direct result of the disclosure requirements,
individuals who would have become involved in the political process
were deterred from doing so due to fear of community censure. 0 By
this requirement, the court demanded that the Conservative Party
give additional specific evidence that potential supporters were deterred due to fear of disclosure. It seems that if the potential supporters came forward and identified themselves in court as such, by
doing so they would run the risk of subjecting themselves to the
exposure and possible subsequent harrassment they fear. Such a
requirement renders the very issues of disclosure and of constitutional rights to privacy in association moot for at least the individual going forward.7"
2.

The Post-Buckley Applications

In the period since the Buckley decision the confusion has continued. In Oregon Socialist Workers Party 1974 Campaign Committee
v. Paulus,72 the Oregon Campaign Disclosure Act" was challenged
on the grounds that disclosure regulations infringed upon the first
amendment rights of the supporters of the Socialist Workers Party.
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon decided
against the Socialist Workers Party on the grounds that the Party
failed to establish a reasonable probability that disclosure would
result in infringement of the supporters' rights. The court so held
despite the evidentiary showing by the Socialist Workers Party of
70. Id.
71. Oregon Socialist Workers 1974 Campaign Committee v. Paulus, 432 F. Supp. 1255,
1259 (D. Ore. 1977).
72. 432 F. Supp. 1255.
73. Oregon Campaign Disclosure Act, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 260.005-260.255 (1975).
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many specific acts of harassment which had occurred when the
identities of supporters had been revealed. "Each instance of alleged harassment set out in the plaintiffs affidavits is insufficient
by itself to justify the conclusion that the valid governmental interests in disclosure are outweighed by the First Amendment rights of
potential SWP supporters."74 Thus, under the strict standard used
by the court, even specific instances of harassment of present supporters were insufficient to favor the first amendment rights of the
organization's supporters or potential supporters.
However, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin viewed the balancing test differently. In
WiscQnsin Socialist Workers 1976 Campaign Committee v.
McCann,7" the court granted injunctive relief preventing the disclosure requirements of Wisconsin7" from being implemented against
the Socialist Workers Party. Here, the court rejected the contention
that specific evidence of harrassment against supporters was required to prove the plaintiffs case. "To require evidence of specific
acts of harassment of contributors would impose an unduly strict
burden on the plaintiffs."" Therefore, the plaintiffs were deemed to
have carried forward their burden and an injunction was issued to
prevent enforcement of the disclosure regulations.78
In still another recent decision, the requirement of specific, evidence of harassment, concerning past, present, or potential supporters was not even mentioned when enjoining the enforcement of
a disclosure regulation. In PartidoNuevo Progresistav. Hernandez
Colon,79 the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico examined a political contribution and disclosure statute which
provided for attendance of observers at large political fund raising
activities to insure that the disclosure regulations were not circumvented. The court held that the statute was unconstitutional and
issued an injunction preventing enforcement. Here, the court required no evidence of harassment to find that the balancing test of
Buckley tipped in favor of enjoining enforcement, as enforcement of
this disclosure regulation would bring about a "chilling effect" on
74.
75.
76.
Supp.
77.
78.

432 F. Supp. at 1255.
433 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
Wisconsin Campaign Financing Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.06(1)(a), (b), (g), (h) (West
1978).
433 F. Supp. at 548.
Id. at 549.

79. 415 F. Supp. 475 (D.P.R. 1976).
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the exercise of first amendment rights of freedom of association.8
Describing the substantial impact the Colon court deemed this disclosure regulation to have on associational rights, the court stated
that "[a] cannon has been used to kill a mockingbird." 8'
Even without concerning itself with specific requirements of evidence of harassment and the extent of physical interference with
political association, the Colon court found it evident that the statutory provision's enforcement ought to be enjoined as unconstitutional. One might find a distinction between a provision requiring
attendance by an observer at a mass rally and another provision
mandating the filing of an extensive report with the government
detailing the supporter's name, address, occupation, place of business, and extent of financial political involvement. However, it
would seem fallacious to rest the protection of an individual's first
amendment rights on whether the disclosure statute is carried out
by the presence of a government observer or rather through the
scrutiny of detailed reports by the same government agent out of the
physical presence of the individual.
3.

The Need for Exact and Consistent Standards

Thus, under the guidelines of the Buckley decision, various federal courts used different standards in applying the balancing test
by requiring different specific evidence of infringement on first
amendment freedom of association rights. A definitive pronouncement as to what requisite showing must be made to enjoin the
enforcement of the disclosure regulations does not seem to be immediately forthcoming.
V.
A.

Factors Enhancing the Freedom from Disclosure

Governmental Interests Are Not Absolute

As the first amendment freedoms must be balanced against other
interests in the test enunciated by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo,
and at least some members of the Court believe that these rights are
not absolute, but may be subject to even substantial encroachment
when balanced against certain governmental interests, so too the
chief governmental interest in disclosure, public information, is not
absolute. The Court has a long history of upholding the interests of
80. Id. at 482.
81. Id. at 483.
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freedom of expression, privacy, and the press when these rights
conflicted with the interest in public information. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Sweezy spoke of the
"inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizens loyalties ' 2 while
deciding that the public right to know did not encompass certain
areas, protecting, for example, the privacy of the ballot. 3
Another aforementioned case, Talley v. California,4 also involved
a conflict between first amendment rights and the public right to
know. There, the Court stressed that the importance of anonymity
in expression may outweigh the value of public knowledge. 5 Hence,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the interests on both
sides of the balancing test are not absolute and may be compromised in certain circumstances.
B.

The Risk of Harassment

As the interests in preventing disclosure may be outweighed in
certain circumstances, the Court has found that conversely, these
interests may become more weighty in the presence of particular
factors. In the balancing test of Buckley, rights of freedom of association were to be protected to a greater degree when the factors
indicated that there was an element of danger inherent in the infringement of these rights. The possible requirement of evidence of
harassment, although subsequently ambiguously applied, is one
such factor. At least it is clear in Buckley that the test of specific
evidence of harassment of supporters will force the balance against
disclosure as an overly severe infringement on the first amendment
freedoms of the supporters.
In the NAACP line of cases, the factor compelling the enjoining
of disclosure was that of harassment. In Louisiana v. NAACP," the
Court stated that disclosure would not be required if it would result
in "reprisals against and hostility to the members.' 7 One of the
great dangers is that harassment will not only infringe upon the
rights of an organization's members or supporters, but that it will
also deter involvement in the political process. The harassment
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

354 U.S. at 265-66.
Id.
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
Id. at 65.
366 U.S. 293 (1961).
Id. at 296.
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resulting from disclosure has undesirable effects which hurt society, not only through the deprivation of free exercise of an individual's fundamental rights, but also by dissuading people from
taking an active role in a crucial part of society.
This was the position of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas in Pollardv. Roberts." In enjoining the
enforcement of a subpoena issued by a district attorney for production of the bank records of the Arkansas Republican Party and
thus preventing disclosure of the Party's supporters, the Court
based its decision on this dual harm which would have resulted
from disclosure.
For various reasons, including fear of reprisal or harrassment, the possibility
of disclosure of their party affiliations and contributions, if any, tends to
inhibit citizens from exercising their right to participate meaningfully in
American political life .... To the extent that a public agency or officer
unreasonably inhibits or discourages the exercise by individuals of their right
to associate with others of the same political persuasion in the advocacy of
principles and candidates of which and of whom they approve, and to support
those principles and candidates with their money if they choose to do so, that
agency or officer violates private rights protected by the First Amendment.5'

Thus, the public interest may be harmed rather than enhanced by
compelled disclosure due to both its effect in the infringement of an
individual's rights and as a deterrent to political involvement. In
evaluating the importance of these deleterious effects, some commentators have noted 0 that although public officials or public figures may be expected to have "thick skins"' 1 in the face of publicity,
the courts have not handed down any similar requirement of voters
or political supporters.
1.

The Chameleonic Nature of Harassment

The harassment which may result in serious injury to the rights
of an individual and the interests of society need not spring only
from official governmental malfeasance, but may flow from private
sources in no way connected with the government. Either may precipitate an injunction against disclosure. The NAACP v. Alabama
decision stated that:
88. 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968).
89. Id. at 258.
90. See Rosenthal, supra note 47.
91. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 159 U.S. 254 (1964).
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[ilt is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive effect compulsory disclosure of names of petitioner's members may have
.. . follows not from state action, but from private community pressures.
The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it
is only after the initial exertion of state power . . . that private action takes
hold. 2

Therefore, harassment or reprisals due to disclosure should not be
discounted merely because the reprisals were based on unofficial
rather than official action.
The Court has also taken cognizance of the various forms in which
harrassment and reprisals may materialize. In his opinion in
Buckley, Chief Justice Burger stated that fear of reprisal may deter
many different individuals from becoming involved in the political
forum for many different reasons. He cited the fact that those seeking advancement in the fields of labor or management may believe
that they should best stay clear of political involvement with candidates or causes disfavored by those in a position to affect their
future. The Chief Justice went on to point out that contributors may
be taking a risk when giving reportable contributions to the opponent of a well-entrenched incumbent officeholder. 3 By doing so, the
Chief Justice may have intimated one possible and not entirely
noble reason for Congressional passage of this statute.
Many commentators have shown that potential for misuse of the
disclosed information is boundless. 4 Should a potential contributor
engage in the same mental exercise, the chance that he may be
deterred from supporting a particular political cause becomes substantial. Unfortunately, in these days of "enemy lists," one need not
have been an astute student of politics to have seen the manner in
which such disclosed information may be used for the purpose of
reprisal."

Also, it is not a unique concept that those supporting unpopular
causes would run the greatest risk of reprisal or harassment and
thus have the greatest need for privacy. Those organizations composed of only an acute minority of the members of the community
or those which advocate positions at the extremes of the political
92.
93.
94.
95.

357 U.S. at 463.
424 U.S. at 237.
See Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 405; Fleishman, supra note 39, at 425.
N.Y. Times, June 28, 1973, at 1, col. 5, 6.
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spectrum are likely targets of harassment or reprisals. It is not
surprising that individuals in such circumstances seek the protection of anonymity in their activity. Indeed, providing such anonymity has through the atmosphere of unfettered debate and association
aided this nation in its development."6
VI.
A.

Blanket Exemptions from Disclosure

The Failure to Decide in Buchley

A challenge of the disclosure provisions seeking a blanket exemption for non-major parties was heard in the Buckley case. The
Court concluded that a blanket exemption was not required. 7 However, the decision stated that the governmental interests in disclosure of the supporters of these organizations was inherently less
important. The Court noted that the public information goal is
furthered little in circumstances where the views of the minor party
are clearly framed in the political spectrum and the chances of a
campaign victory are slight.' However, despite recognition of the
sensitivity of non-major parties through disclosure to the potentialities of harassment, of the public importance of such organizations
in furthering the free circulation of beliefs, and the mitigated importance of the governmental interests in such disclosure, the Court
found that the infringements of first amendment rights were too
speculative."
B.

Inherently Disqualifying Factors

When considering the application for blanket exemptions for the
non-major parties, the Court examined the circumstances surrounding organizations not inherently disqualified from exemption from
disclosure on other grounds. Of these inherently disqualifying
96. At the time of the very origin of this nation, many of the founding fathers used
anonymous political authorship to advocate their positions. Even the Federalist Papers of
Madison, Jay, and Hamilton were first published under the name "Publius." Within the
first twenty years of the existence of our Republic, some six presidents, twenty senators,
thirty-four congressmen, and fifteen cabinet members advocated various political positions
anonymously. Even members of the United States Supreme Court have used this tool as
demonstrated by Chief Justice Marshall in his defense of certain Supreme Court decisions,
writing under the name of "a friend of the Republic." See Comment, The Constitutional
Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 Yale L.J. 1084, 1084-85 (1961).
97. 424 U.S. at 72-74.
98. Id. at 70.
99. Id.
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grounds, two organizational characteristics have stood out as factors
overriding the organization's rights to privacy in association. First,
the Court has distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate political parties. Illegitimate political parties are those organizations
dominated by a particular foreign country. One such organization
questioned the constitutionality of disclosure and was rebuffed by
the Court in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board. ' This first distinction was further enforced when the Court
protected members of the Progressive Party from compelled disclosure in Sweezy,' 0 ' and two years later denied such protection to
02
those associated with the Communist Party in Uphais v. Wyman.
The second inherently disqualifying organizational characteristic
was violence. It was this distinction which allowed the Court to
uphold the registration of Ku Klux Klan in Bryant v. Zimmer03
man.
In Buckley, the Court was not faced with organizations infirm due
to the above-mentioned deficiencies. These non-major legitimate
peaceful parties asserted the claim that as the infringements of
their supporters' constitutional rights were substantial, and as the
government's interest was mitigated when applied in the context
of small third parties, the Court should have granted a blanket
exemption from disclosure. As stated above, the Court did not decide whether the government's interest in disclosure as applied to
non-major parties outweighed the aggravated potential infringement of these parties' supporters' rights, because the Court found
that the potential for harassment was simply too speculative. I0' In
doing so, the Court may have disregarded the possibility that the
statute was infirm for another reason: that of statutory overbreadth.
• VII. The Infirmity of Statutory Overbreadth
The Court has long held that legislative measures must be tailored to precisely fit the governmental interests. 015 Should broader
100. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
101. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
102. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
103. 278 U.S. 63 (1929). See Fleishman, supra note 39, at 420-422.
104. 424 U.S. at 70.
105. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 50 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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means than are justified be enacted with a resulting impact on those
within the grasp but not within the purpose of the legislation, the
Court has consistently held that the statute should be struck down
as overbroad.10 1 This is especially true when the potential harm
affects first amendment rights. "In the area of First Amendment
freedoms government has a duty to confine itself to the least intrusive regulations which are adequate for the purposes," stated Mr.
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Lamont v. Postmaster
General."°7 As the governmental interests futhered by the regulations' application to minor parties were quite questionable and the
consequences quite severe, it seems evident that broader means
than were justified were enacted in the disclosure requirements.
However, the per curiam opinion in Buckley, rather than discussing
the overbreadth issue, simply dismissed the claim of the non-major
parties. Even though the overbreadth argument was raised in the
opinion of Chief Justice Burger,' ° and was articulated by commentators ' 9 prior to the Court's decision in Buckley, the Court failed to
address the issue in its decision.
The Court also failed to maintain its resistance to overbroad legislation with regard to the statute's monetary thresholds, the dollar
amount contributed beyond which the disclosure regulations are
applied. The Buckley plaintiffs argued that the $10 threshold which
triggered the recording requirements and the $100 threshold which
triggered the disclosure requirements were far too low to serve any
legitimate governmental interest. Again, the plaintiffs claimed an
infringement of first amendment rights due to sloppy draftsmanship
of the statute rather than compelling governmental interests." 0
106. See cases cited in note 105 supra.
107. 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965).
108. 424 U.S. at 240.
109. See Fleishman, supra note 39, at 430-432.
110. These original $10 and $100 thresholds seem to have been drawn without modifications from election legislation dealt with in 1910 by Congress. Chief Justice Burger pointed
out the effect of the lack of consideration that Congress applied in the drafting of this
particular section of the statute. The Chief Justice observed that inflationary pressures over

a sixty-five year period of time would reduce the value of $10 in 1910 to $1.68 in 1976. 424
U.S. at 239.
The reporting thresholds were later raised by Congress from $10 to $50. The $100 disclosure
statute was left intact. This change has already been attacked. by commentators as doing
little to cure the problem of overbreadth. See Comment, Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme
Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 851, 880-881 (1976).
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The Court again side-stepped the thrust of the plaintiffs' claims,
this time basing its approval of the statute on the public information interest advanced by the government, and thus avoiding the
issue that the goal of preventing corruption was not advanced.",
The Court upheld the thresholds as "not wholly without rationality"' 2 in their relation to the interests advanced by the government.
VIII.

The "Not Wholly Without Rationality" Standard A Departure from Tradition

As discussed above, the Court's decisions have included various
imprecise terms to define the requisite governmental interest which
would justify infringement on first amendment rights. As imprecise
as the terms are, however, it appears that the "not wholly without
rationality" standard is a deviation from the strict standards of the
past. Two problems immediately arise from this test. First, this
standard seems to show an absence of the traditional concern with
potential "chilling" effects on the exercise of first amendment
rights. Second, this test seems again to fail to satisfy the established
requirement that governmental regulations affecting the exercise of
first amendment rights must be drafted with care and precision in
order to survive the once traditional constitutional scrutiny."'
Even when one accepts the new standard, there are still questions
relating to how the "rationality" test could have been met as Congress did not consider the constitutional implications of its actions.
The legislative history shows that Congress failed to focus on the
potential first amendment difficulties of the threshold amounts but
rather uninquisitively drew the figures from a sixty-five year-old
piece of legislation."' The combination of these factors points to a
conclusion that the Court may have failed to display the traditional sensitivity exercised in examining the potential infringement
of first amendment rights, especially with regard to those members
and supporters of non-major parties. The Court also seemed to
display an unusual degree of tolerance of Congressional action sin
Congressional judgment in an area touching the exercise of first
amendment rights. However, the Court left open the possibility of
111.
112.
113.
114.

424 U.S. at 83.
Id.
See note 105 supra.
424 U.S. at 239.
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future successful challenges of the threshold amounts by implying
that at a later date, the Court may hold that experience reveals a
tendency of the statutes to deter some individuals from political
involvement."'

IX. Conclusion
The central problems in federal disclosure legislation arise from
the deep-rooted conflicts which occur when the exercise of first
amendment freedom of association and privacy directly clash with
the government's interest in compelling disclosure of an individual's
political involvement. The balancing of many factors, which include
the threat of harassment of the free exercise of fundamental rights
as against the gravity of the government's interests achieved
through compelled disclosure, is not a light task. The task is especially difficult as the stakes involved on either side are of great
importance. Judicial conflicts with regard to requisite evidentiary
demonstrations, the use of imprecise and vacillating criteria in
matters central to conflict determination, the inconsistencies between courts concerning the granting of exemptions from disclosure,
and the toleration of poor legislative draftsmanship with regard to
statutory overbreadth as well as Congressional apathy toward fundamental rights, do not make the application of this important
balancing test an easier task.
An individual's monetary contribution to a political organization,
like the placard or the handbill, allows the individual to unambiguously express and ally himself with a particular set of views or
beliefs. In a free society, this activity is perfectly consonant with,
indeed is the very exercise of, the freedoms of speech and of association. We must recognize regardless of whether it is to our liking
that we have entered an era of highly expert, technical, and complex campaign production. In such an atmosphere, contributing
money to candidates or political organizations may be the only
meaningful way, besides voting, that a citizen can become involved
in the political process." ' Interference with such an important
activity certainly deserves the most serious judicial consideration.
Due to the weighty interests involved, the Court is obliged to promulgate demandingly exact standards in consistent determinations.
115.
116.

Id. at 83.
283 F. Supp. at 258.
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Especially in an era of declining participation in the democratic
franchise, even incidental deterrence of political involvement and
infringement of freedoms in this area cannot be undertaken without recognition of the grievous harm to one of the most fundamental
components of our society. Failure on the part of the legislatures or
the courts to properly safeguard from infringement the fundamental
rights of individuals in the creationary political arena may not chill
the many freedoms we find so dear, it may freeze them half to death.
Robert M. Horkovich

